We develop a discrete-choice model of differentiated products for US corn and soybean seed demand to study the welfare impact of genetically engineered (GE) crop varieties. Using a unique data set spanning the period 1996-2011, we find that the welfare impact of the GE innovation is significant. In the last five years of the period analyzed, our preferred counterfactual indicates that total surplus due to GE traits was $5.18 billion per year, with seed manufacturers appropriating 56% of this surplus. The seed industry obtained more surplus from GE corn, whereas farmers received more surplus from GE soybeans.
Introduction
Innovation, in the form of new and improved crop varieties, has long played a critical role in the quest to ensure sufficient food supply for a rapidly growing world population. Conventional breeding activities have led to remarkable successes, such as hybrid maize (Griliches, 1957) and the green revolution (Evenson and Gollin, 2003) . Genetically engineered (GE) crop varieties build on this tradition by exploiting the recombinant DNA tools of modern biotechnology. First introduced commercially in 1996, by most standards, GE varieties have been very successful (Moschini, 2008) . Despite being essentially limited to four main crops (maize, soybean, cotton, and canola), as of 2017, GE varieties were grown on more than 469 million acres worldwide. The United States has been at the forefront of these developments: in 2017, GE varieties were planted on more than 183 million acres of US farmland, nearly 91% of which was maize and soybeans (ISAAA, 2017) .
Notwithstanding their productivity-enhancing potential, GE crops have been highly controversial. Concerns raised include the fear that GE products are harmful to human health and/or the environment, and ethical objections related to human manipulation of the DNA of living plants and animals. Many of these concerns have been allayed (Bennett et al., 2013) . In particular, the environmental impacts of GE varieties appear to be generally positive (NRC, 2010; Barrows, Sexton, and Zilberman, 2014; . However, a separate persistent source of public mistrust relates to the ownership interests of multinational corporations that commercialize GE products. Unlike innovations underpinning the green revolution, which were largely the result of publicly sponsored research and development (R&D) activities (Wright, 2012) , GE crop varieties have been primarily developed by private firms, with US seed companies (Monsanto in primis) at the forefront. The proprietary nature of GE technologies, and an ongoing consolidation of the seed and agrochemical industry, has heightened concerns about the pricing of these new products, their contribution to welfare, and the actual beneficiaries of the innovation (Clancy and Moschini, 2017) .
In this article, we provide novel econometric evidence on the welfare effects of the introduction of GE crop varieties. We draw on a large, proprietary data set of plot-level seed choices by a representative sample of US farmers for the two most important GE crops, corn and soybeans. The data span the period from 1996 (the year GE corn and soybean varieties were first introduced) to 2011 (by which time the average adoption rate of GE varieties exceeded 90%), and contain information on the specific seed products that farmers buy-brand, amount bought, area planted, price paid, and which (if any) GE traits are included in the seed. The richness of the data allows us to estimate an explicit structural model of farmers' demand for seed varieties rooted in the theory of discrete choice in a differentiated product setting (Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse, 1992) . Although this model pertains to a production input (seeds) used by competitive firms, rather than consumer products, it is nonetheless in the tradition of the empirical industrial organization (IO) literature on demand estimation in industries with differentiated products (Berry, scenarios of the US corn and soybean seed markets without GE traits as an available technology. To this end, we first determine the seed prices that would have been charged had GE seeds not been introduced (the "counterfactual prices"). A structural equilibrium approach to this question is problematic, because the supply side is characterized by a complex web of GE trait cross-licensing agreements (the terms of which are confidential) between seed firms. Hence, we take a reduced-form approach that relies on a hedonic regression along the lines of Hausman and Leonard (2002) .
Counterfactual prices, along with the estimated seed demand model, permit the computation of farmers' counterfactual expected profits. We do so for four alternative counterfactual choice sets. In one scenario, we simply remove all seed products with GE traits from farmers' choice sets. This "naive" scenario, however, ignores the fact that, as GE seeds became widely adopted over time, the set of available non-GE seeds was increasingly reduced. The crowding out of existing products by new products is an issue that has received relatively little explicit attention (an exception is Eizenberg, 2014) . In our context, the naive scenario entails reduced farmers' choice sets, particularly later in the sample. Insofar as this feature of the counterfactual is artificial, it produces an upward bias in the estimated welfare gain from GE traits. To address this problem, we consider three other counterfactual product choice sets, by removing the GE trait characteristics from any GE product available in a market, while presuming that this results in a viable seed product. In all cases, the hedonic price function permits us to impute counterfactual prices for all products in the counterfactual choice sets.
In the most realistic scenario ("keep conventional"), we estimate that the availability of GE varieties increased farmers' welfare by about $22.2 billion during the 1996-2011 period, with three quarters of these gains attributable to one trait: glyphosate tolerance in soybeans. Correspondingly, the same counterfactual scenario indicates that the development and diffusion of GE traits increased seed revenue, in the US corn and soybean industry, by about $25.3 billion. Hence, even under this approach, the seed industry was able to appropriate about 53% of the ex post value created by GE technologies. This additional revenue can be interpreted as the ex post return to R&D activities that led to the development of GE varieties.
Our analysis adds to the literature on the estimation of the value of product innovation (Trajtenberg, 1989; Hausman, 1996; Petrin, 2002; Nevo, 2003; Eizenberg, 2014; Allenby et al., 2014) by focusing squarely on the introduction of new characteristics (the GE traits). In particular, both the data and the econometric framework employed in this article, are new for the purpose of assessing the welfare impacts of GE crops. Unlike much prior agricultural technological change that was rooted in publicly sponsored research, the proprietary nature of GE traits requires suitable noncompetitive market settings to model their welfare impacts (Lapan and Moschini, 2004) . Previous studies that attempted to estimate these welfare effects (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000; Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000; Sobolevsky, Moschini and Lapan, 2005) lacked an econometric backbone and instead relied on indirect evidence to parameterize partial equilibrium models used for counterfactual analysis. As such, they were ill-suited to capture the impact of seed pricing of GE crops that is critical in this setting. Using a subset of the proprietary data employed in this article, Shi, Chavas, and Stiegert (2010) (with extensions in Chavas, 2011, and Stiegert, 2012) estimate hedonic regressions for the period 2000-2007 and find positive premiums for most GE traits in both corn and soybeans. However, unlike the present article, these studies do not model farmers' seed demand explicitly, and thus lack the necessary structure to infer welfare effects.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the introduction of GE traits in soybean and corn seeds, their adoption, and the evolution of market shares. Section 3 presents the data used in the econometric analysis. Section 4 develops the discrete-choice farmers' seed demand model. Section 5 reports the estimation results for this model. Section 6 presents the welfare analysis: farmers' WTP estimates, farmers' estimated increase in expected profit due to GE innovations, and the increase in seed industry revenues due to GE traits. Section 7 concludes. Note: "Bt maize" refers to varieties with at least one IR trait (alone or with the GT trait), and "GT maize" refers to varieties with the GT trait (alone or in combination with other traits). Source: USDA-NASS (2000 and GfK Kynetec data (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) .
Background: GE traits in US corn and soybean seeds
GE crops (also known as transgenic crops) are the most visible agricultural manifestation of modern biotechnology and its use of recombinant DNA techniques. Their distinguishing feature is the insertion, in the plant's genome, of one or more foreign genes that express desirable traits. In corn and soybeans, these traits have encompassed two sets of attributes: herbicide tolerance (HT) and insect resistance (IR). The vast majority of HT crops are tolerant to glyphosate, a broad spectrum herbicide marketed by Monsanto under the trademark Roundup R . IR crops embed one or more genes from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (hence, the widely used "Bt" moniker), which emit proteins that are toxic to certain insects. For soybeans, the only trait with commercial relevance thus far has been glyphosate tolerance (GT), whereas for corn, both GT and Bt traits have been commercialized. Initially, GE varieties had a single trait, but over time, commercial varieties have come to embed multiple GE traits, or what are often referred to as "stacked" GE trait varieties. Figure 1 charts the diffusion pattern of GE varieties in US soybeans and corn, where "Bt maize" refers to varieties with at least one IR trait (alone or with the GT trait), and "GT maize" refers to varieties with the GT trait (alone or in combination with other traits). Adoption has been rapid: GE corn and soybeans were first introduced in the United States in 1996 and within just 10 years, accounted for the majority of planted acres in both crops.
GE traits are valuable to farmers because they offer novel (cost-reducing and/or yieldenhancing) tools for weed and insect control. To guarantee adoption, however, GE traits need to be combined with proven germplasm-the genetics accumulated from traditional breeding and selection activities that result in high-yielding and desirable commercial seed varieties. Thus, GE traits and germplasm are truly complementary assets (Graff, Rausser, and Small, 2003) , both of which have become extremely valuable to seed manufacturers due to the increasing importance of intellectual property rights (Moschini, 2010) . Well before the advent of genetic engineering, the ), and Farm Journal Magazine (2012 -2015 .
corn seed industry had already thrived through its use of hybridization (which requires farmers to buy first-generation seeds for each planting) and trade secrets, which together effectively prevent imitation. By contrast, commercial soybeans are self-pollinating and thus reproduce "true to type," allowing farmers to replant seed from the previous season's harvest without any loss in expected yield. The introduction of patented GE traits, and the ability of seed companies to write (and enforce) restrictive retailing contracts forbidding farmers to save and replant seeds that contain such traits, thus significantly increased the profitability of selling soybean seeds. The company Monsanto played a pioneering role in this process, 1 and its commitment to the development of GE crops has had major implications for the seed industry. The quest to commercialize GE traits led to a wave of acquisitions and mergers that promoted a rapid consolidation in the seed industry (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004; Musselli Moretti, 2006) . When Monsanto originally developed and patented its GE traits it did not have a presence in the seed industry, and thus lacked direct access to commercial seed varieties. As a result, Monsanto pursued two parallel strategies for the commercialization of its GE traits. First, it embarked on a series of acquisitions that, over time, transformed it into the largest seed company in the world. At the same time, Monsanto aggressively licensed GE traits to other seed companies, which also sped up the availability of GE traits to farmers.
Monsanto's critical acquisitions included Asgrow (in 1997), Dekalb (in 1998), and Holden Foundation Seeds (in 1997). The early emphasis on broad "life science" companies also led to Monsanto becoming the agricultural subsidiary of Pharmacia Corporation in 2000, only to be spun off as an independent company in 2002. Similar considerations led DuPont to acquire Pioneer, the dominant seed company at the time, in 1999. Syngenta was formed in 2000 as an agrochemical and seed business from the consolidation and restructuring of major life science companies (Novartis and AstraZeneca). Dow AgroSciences, a subsidiary of Dow Chemical formed in 1997, acquired Mycogen in 1998. By the year 2000, when AgReliant (a joint venture of KWS and Limagrain) was also formed, the fundamental structure of the corn and soybean seed industry had been established, although a number of other, smaller acquisitions would be made in subsequent years (especially by Monsanto) .
Market shares, reported as four-year averages for the 2000-2015 period, are displayed in Table 1 . Data for 2000-2011 are from GfK Kynetec, the source of the proprietary data used in the econometric analysis. For the most recent years, the market shares reported in Table 1 are from the Farm Journal, a trade magazine. 2 These market share data show an industry with two dominant firms (Monsanto and DuPont) who control approximately 60% of the soybean seed market and 70% of the corn seed market. Three other firms (Syngenta, Dow AgroSciences, and AgReliant) have considerably smaller but significant presence, with the industry completed by a panoply of local and regional companies. Table 1 also shows the almost complete disappearance of the once-common practice of seed saving in soybeans (which accounted for more than 25% of soybean planting prior to the advent of GE varieties).
Data
The data used in this study consists of a large set of farm-level observations of seed choices by US corn and soybean farmers for the period 1996-2011. In particular, we use the soybean and corn TraitTrak R data sets, two proprietary data sets developed by GfK Kynetec, a unit of a major market research organization that specializes in the collection of agriculture-related survey data. GfK Kynetec constructs the TraitTrak R data from annual surveys of randomly sampled farmers in the United States. The samples are developed to be representative at the crop reporting district (CRD) level. 3 From 1996-2011, the data are based on responses from an average of 4716 farmers per year for maize and 3573 farmers per year for soybeans. In the survey, farmers are asked about the types (brand and hybrid/variety identity), amounts, and cost of seed they purchase. 4 Furthermore, with each purchase instance we observe the list of GE traits (if any) embedded in the variety. Importantly, the period we observe covers the early stages of GE trait adoption up to its almost complete diffusion by 2011.
Traits. Each of the various GE traits were introduced at different times in our sample. In soybeans, the GT trait was introduced by Monsanto in 1996 as Roundup Ready R soybeans, and in corn, the GT trait was first commercialized in 1998. The main attraction of the GT trait is that, by allowing post-emergence applications of glyphosate without causing injury to the crop, it greatly facilitates and reduces the cost of weed control. 5 The first Bt trait in maize was introduced in 1996 and conferred resistance to the European corn borer (CB). Later Bt traits, which provided resistance to various species of corn rootworms (RW), were introduced in 2003. The attractiveness of Bt varieties is that they increase expected yields and reduce yield volatility (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2013) , while also reducing the need for insecticides to control pests. Unlike GT traits, which are highly complementary to a specific chemical, Bt traits substitute for chemical inputs . 2 The market share data reported by Farm Journal are based on polling industry analysts and executives, and have been published since 2009. In the three years (2009-2011) that the Farm Journal and GfK Kynetec data overlap, the firm-level shares are very similar.
3 CRDs are multicounty substate regions identified by the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). 4 The Supplementary Information online web Appendix (Appendix B) provides a detailed description on the steps taken to prepare the data. 5 The GT trait is not the only herbicide-tolerant trait in corn and soybeans. There is also a GE trait that provides tolerance to the herbicide glufosinate. This trait was developed by Bayer and marketed under the tradename LibertyLink (LL). It has been available in some corn varieties since 1996 and in some soybean varieties since 2009. In our econometric analysis, we ignore this trait for two reasons. First, it has been rarely adopted, especially in soybeans, where it only became available in very limited quantities late in our sample. In corn, this trait can be found in more commercialized varieties, but this is mostly because it primarily served as a marker gene for the Bt traits (a marker gene is used to determine whether the insertion process was successful). Thus, most growers did not intend to use the LibertyLink trait when they purchased varieties that (incidentally) contained it. Indeed, based on pesticide data used in , we found that only a small fraction of corn producers who purchased seed containing the LL trait actually used any glufosinate herbicide. There are also traditionally bred varieties that are tolerant to the imidazoline herbicide (for corn) and to sulfonylurea herbicides (for soybeans). As with the LL trait, such varieties have had low adoption rates. Because our focus is on the difference in value between GE and non-GE crops, in our primary econometric analysis, we ignore these other herbicide-tolerance traits. Figure 1 shows that the adoption of GE varieties, however fast by most standards, was gradual. This diffusion pattern is explained by both demand-and supply-side factors. On the demand side, learning and farmer heterogeneity played a role. On the supply side, the nature of the technology to develop and bring GE crops to market is critical. Because this plays an important role in our identification strategy, we provide more details at that juncture. Table 2 reports detailed GE trait adoption rates (as a fraction of total planted acres for the corresponding crop). Each column provides the annual adoption rate for a specific GE trait combination (thus, in corn, the sum across columns is the total annual GE adoption rate). Among all GE crop combinations, the most rapidly adopted were GT soybeans, which even surpassed the rate at which corn hybrids were adopted (Griliches, 1957) . By 2003, over 90% of land was planted to GT soybeans, and by 2011, it was 96%. The adoption of GT maize was slower, but still achieved a 90% rate by 2011. The adoption of IR traits has been steady as well, with the CB traits (alone or in combination) attaining a 72% adoption rate, and RW traits (alone or in combination) achieving a 55% adoption rate by 2011. This table also illustrates the gradual penetration of stacked-trait varieties. By 2011, the triple stack GT-CB-RW was adopted on 54% of maize acres. Note also that the RW trait, owing to its relatively late introduction, has had little diffusion as a stand-alone trait, instead becoming available to farmers primarily in combination with other traits. Table 3 reports nominal per-acre average seed costs for each GE trait combination. These prices reveal three important stylized facts about the seed markets. First, all prices have trended up over time. Both GE and non-GE prices more than doubled from 1996 to 2011. Second, GE varieties command a substantial premium over non-GE varieties. In soybeans, the premium was around $9/acre, and in corn, the premium ranged from about $9/acre for stand-alone trait varieties to nearly $30/acre for varieties with all three GE traits. Third, over time, GE prices increased by more than non-GE prices. In soybeans, the average premium in 2011 was about $9, $5 greater than the average premium in 1996, but actually smaller than the average premiums in 1999 and 2002. In corn, the price difference between GE and traditional varieties widened significantly over time. The average premium for corn with the GT trait, for example, was just $4-$5 per acre prior to 2005, but then increased significantly to about $16/acre by 2011. Similar increases occurred for the other corn GE combinations.
Brands. The marketing of seeds relies heavily on brand labels. Well-known and longstanding brands such as Dekalb and Pioneer identify germplasm that was developed over a long period of time, and carry an established reputation among growers. Some descriptive data for each of the major brands in our sample are reported in Table 4 .
Most brands have a presence in both corn and soybeans, albeit at a different intensity. For example, Monsanto has primarily marketed corn under the Dekalb brand and soybeans under the Asgrow brand. By contrast, DuPont uses the Pioneer brand heavily in both corn and soybeans. There is also variation in the number of brands held by the different parent companies. Monsanto and Syngenta utilize multiple brands, whereas DuPont almost exclusively uses Pioneer. Brandspecific average prices demonstrate significant variation, reflecting a number of effects, including the average value of the underlying germplasm, and the extent of inclusion of GE traits. The latter explains the particularly low average price of publicly available soybean seeds, which do not include any GE traits.
Product lines. An essential step in our empirical discrete-choice framework is the definition of a "product." Our goal is to capture, in a tractable way, the main seed characteristics that matter to buyers: that is, the nature of the germplasm, which is captured by the seed brand, and the presence of GE traits. Hence, for the purpose of this study, we define a seed "product" as a unique combination of four types of characteristics: (i) the crop (corn or soybeans); (ii) the parent company (e.g., Monsanto); (iii) the brand (e.g., Asgrow); and, (iv) the presence (or absence) of GE traits, specifically glyphosate tolerance (GT), corn borer (CB) resistance, and rootworm (RW) resistance. 6 One of the important features to note about our product definition is that the number and type of varieties that are aggregated within each product change over space and time. For example, from 2003 to 2011, the number of Pioneer corn varieties purchased with the GT trait rose from 9 to 75. It is thus perhaps more appropriate to think of a "product" as a "product line," one which is subject to change over time. One implication of this is that, within our econometric framework, the value of a GE product line should be permitted to change over time. As more and more hybrids are offered with a particular GE trait combination, a wider range of grower needs can be matched, raising the average value of that trait combination. Thus, in estimating our econometric model, we permit the return to GE varieties to differ over three subperiods. By doing so, we also accommodate other largely exogenous changes in the industry, such as glyphosate going off patent in 2000, and the commodity price boom of 2007-2008.
Market definition. The definition of a market determines the set of available products to residing farmers. We define a market as a CRD-year combination. As previously noted, CRDs are multicounty, substate regions. We define a market at this level for three reasons. First, a CRD is the level at which the GfK Kynetec survey data are designed to be representative. Second, corn and soybean varieties are bred to possess characteristics that suit particular agro-climatic conditions, and such conditions are relatively homogeneous within a given CRD. Finally, this is the spatial definition of markets that seed firms themselves use to analyze competitive issues (Monsanto, 2009) . Overall, this definitions results in 3874 markets (CRD-year combinations) encompassing 294 distinct CRDs. 7 A delicate issue, in this context, concerns the definition of the potential market size. Ideally, in a given market, this is given by the amount of land that could realistically be planted to corn or soybeans. To identify this area, we use cropland measures from the Census of Agriculture (USDA-NASS, 2014). This is the main source of data concerning land use in the United States, and it is available at five-year intervals (Bigelow and Borchers, 2017) . The cropland measure we use includes "cropland used for crops" (itself encompassing three components: cropland harvested, crop failure, and cultivated summer fallow) and "idle cropland." Perhaps unsurprisingly, we observe very little variation in cropland acres over time. Hence, within each CRD, we assume that the size of potential total seed demand is constant over our sample period, and specifically define it as the maximum of reported cropland across the four censuses that pertain to years encompassed by our sample period (1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012) . 8 Table 5 reports the average number of products in each market. For both corn and soybeans, the number of products increased steadily up until about 2007, and then declined thereafter. This pattern reflects the fact that, as the adoption of GE traits increased (recall Figure 1 ), more and more varieties became available to farmers both with and without GE traits. Later in the sample, as farmers' demand for transgenic varieties exceeded that for traditionally bred varieties, some of the latter were discontinued. This pattern is more marked in corn, because there are three GE traits (GT, CB, and RW), compared to one in soy (GT). The fact that the number of products changed so significantly over time is a distinctive attribute of the industry. As we discuss in more Note: A "seed product" is a unique combination of four types of characteristics-see Section 3 for more details. The number of seed products in 1996 provide a good approximation on the number of products per market prior to the introduction of GE traits. The Supplementary Information online web Appendix (Appendix C) reports data for all years in the 1996-2011 period. Source: Computed from GfK Kynetec data.
detail below, this has certain challenging implications for estimating the welfare associated with the introduction of GE crops.
Farmers' Seed Demand
Each unit of observation in the data is a farmer's choice of a seed product, denoted by j, to be planted on plot i of size L i . We model this decision as a discrete choice with a profitmaximization objective. The profit from planting plot i with seed product j can be expressed as
is the quantity of seed, Z i is the vector of all inputs apart from seed and land (e.g., fertilizers, labor, energy, . . . ), W is the corresponding vector of input prices, and P j is the price of seed product j. Note that we are omitting the rental price of land in this representation, so profit represents the return to the quasifixed input land.
The production function is written as Y i = F j (L i , S i , Z i ). Note that this function, in principle, is specific to the identity of seed product j (this captures the fact that, compared with traditional seed products, GE varieties may use different amounts and types of pesticides and/or a different quantity of labor). We assume that this production function satisfies two basic properties: constant returns to scale (i.e., doubling all inputs doubles total output); and, a fixed proportion of land and seed. That is, we can write the production function as
where the parameter λ j denotes seed density (amount of seed per unit of land). By construction, f j (Z i /L i ) is strictly concave in the vector of input intensities Z i /L i . For a given plot of size L i , and given that at an optimal solution we have S i = λ j L i , optimal input intensities Z i /L i imply that the per-acre maximized profit can be represented as
Because of the linear homogeneity property of π j (R, W ), the per-acre profit function is homogeneous of degree one in the vector of all prices (R, W, P j ). In the econometric application that follows, we pool seed choices across multiple years, during which prices changed dramatically. To account for this, we exploit the homogeneity property and deflate all prices by an appropriate input price index W I and write per-acre profit in real terms, π i j ≡ i j /(L i W I ), to obtain
where π i j is the profit per acre on plot i when using seed product j, (r, w) is the vector of deflated prices of output and all other inputs, and p j ≡ λ j P j /W I is the deflated price of seed product j (expressed in per-acre terms). 9
The econometric model. Building on equation (2), we model farmers as selecting the seed product that provides the highest expected profit per acre on plot i in market m, that is, they choose product j such that
where J m denotes the number of seed products available in market m, and j = 0 denotes the outside option. We specify per-acre profits in (2) as being composed of an observable and unobservable part. The observable part is assumed to be linear in parameters, and to depend on product characteristics, as well as a number of fixed and random effects. Specifically, the per-acre profit of choosing seed product j on plot i in market m is written as:
or, following standard notation, π i jm = δ jm + ν i jm , where δ jm denotes the mean profit that is common across all plots within market m. Here, the vector x j comprises indicator variables that code for the presence of one or more GE traits in seed product j (these variables take value zero for conventional seed products), and p jm is the associated price. Note that we allow the impact of GE traits, via the coefficient γ t[m] , to possibly change over time (in the empirical results reported below, we specifically identify three distinct subperiods with different values associated to GE traits). For the outside option, we follow standard convention and set π i0m = ν i0m . Similar to most empirical discrete-choice models, the price p jm enters linearly in equation (4). However, in contrast to consumer demand models, where linearity is typically a functional form simplification, in our context, it follows directly from the structural assumption of fixed proportions between land and seed, a property of the production technology that applies to this setting.
The l[m] , and ξ c[ j],b [ j] are, respectively, crop-time, crop-region, and cropbrand fixed effects. The subscript notation follows Gelman and Hill (2007) : c [ j] indicates the crop output associated with seed product j (either soybeans or corn), b [ j] indicates the brand of seed product j (for example, Dekalb), t [m] denotes the year corresponding to market m, and l[m] denotes the CRD corresponding to market m (l stands for location). This large set of fixed effects controls for unobservable heterogeneity in yields, output, and input prices across time, regions, brands, and crops. The term ξ jm captures the unobserved product-market-specific components that motivate our identification discussion below. Finally, ν i jm is the unobserved plot-specific component.
To make the choice model in (3)-(4) operational, we need distributional assumptions on the plot-specific unobservable ν i jm . We model the demand for corn and soybean seed products using a two-level nested logit specification (Verboven 1996; Björnerstedt and Verboven, 2016) . We specify the upper level as consisting of the outside option and the set of inside options, where the latter consists of all corn and soybean seed products. We then further partition the inside options into two subgroups, one for soybean seed products and the other for corn seed products.
Partitioning the choice problem in this way is consistent with basic facts about US corn and soybean production. Less than 5% of corn and soybean production occurs on farms with a single crop (MacDonald, Korb, and Hoppe, 2013) . Farms that produce both corn and soybeans are ubiquitous, especially in the Midwest. Because planting and harvest timings differ somewhat between these two crops, economies of scope can be obtained in the use of farm labor and machinery. Crop diversification on the farm can also be motivated by rotation considerations (Hennessy, 2006) . Indeed, the practice of alternating between corn and soybeans on a given plot is widespread in US agriculture, as it has been shown to increase profit by increasing yields, reducing fertilizer needs, and improving weed control (Bullock, 1992) . Hence, a given plot planted to corn (soybeans) in year t − 1 is much more likely to be planted to soybean (corn) in year t. Thus, our presumption is that, for example, if the expected return to a corn seed product on a given plot is unattractive, a grower will typically be much more likely to consider another corn seed product as Corn seed products Soybean seed products an alternative, rather than switch to a soybean seed product instead. Furthermore, in the Midwest (where most of these two crops are produced), corn and soybeans are by far the dominant crops. That is, switching to the outside option, from planting either corn or soybeans, is uncommon and even less likely than switching between corn and soybeans. 10 As shown by Grigolon and Verboven (2014) , when such market segments are an important differentiating dimension, the nested logit model can perform as well as computationally more complex random-coefficient models.
The assumed nesting structure is illustrated in Figure 2 . Let the choice set in market m be partitioned into two mutually exclusive groups denoted by g ∈ {0, 1}, where g = 0 represents the outside option and g = 1 represents inside goods. The latter group is further partitioned into two subgroups denoted by h ∈ {1, 2}, where h = 1 represents corn seed products and h = 2 represents soybean seed products. Following Verboven (1996) , we specify the plot-specific unobserved component as follows:
where we invoke the standard assumption that ε igm , ε ihgm , and ε i jm possess the unique distribution such that the terms of interest have an extreme value distribution (Berry, 1994; Verboven, 1996) . The nesting parameters σ 1 and σ 2 measure the correlation between the unobservable components of different products within the same subgroup (σ 1 ) and within the same group (σ 2 ). To be consistent with random-utility maximization, it is necessary that 0 ≤ σ 2 ≤ σ 1 < 1. If σ 1 is large, farmer preferences are strongly correlated across seed products in the same subgroup (soybeans or corn), and if σ 2 is also large, then this increases the correlation across seeds of both crops. When σ 2 = σ 1 , preferences are equally correlated among all seed products (the subgroup distinction between soybeans and corn is immaterial). The special case σ 1 = σ 2 = 0 would reduce the model to the simple logit.
In any given market, let the set of seed products in subgroup h of group g be denoted J hgm . Then, the choice probability for seed product j ∈ J hgm (the market share) is given by:
where I hgm , I gm , and I m are "inclusive values" defined as follows (Björnerstedt and Verboven, 2016) :
Again, in our setting, g = 1 denotes the group of all inside goods, and this group comprises two subgroups (h = 1, 2). Based on this specification, recalling the definition of δ jm , we obtain the estimating equation for our two-level nested logit:
where S h1m ≡ j∈J h1m s jm is the aggregate share of all products in subgroup h ∈ {1, 2}, and S 1m = S 11m + S 21m is the total share of all inside goods. Hence, s jm /S h1m is the (conditional) share of seed product j within subgroup h (i.e., corn or soybean), and S h1m /S 1m is the (conditional) share of subgroup h in group g = 1 (the group of all inside goods). Finally, s 0m = 1 − S 1m is the share of the outside option.
As we discuss further below, these shares are endogenous and therefore require instruments. In addition, the coefficient that we estimate on the price variable, α ≡ 1/μ, is the reciprocal of the scale parameter μ associated with the i.i.d. extreme value error term. This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of preference heterogeneity in the population (Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse, 1992) . Also, the parameters β in equation (10) are related to γ in equation (4) by γ = β/α.
Identification.
The key identification issue is the endogeneity of seed prices, which seed manufacturers set taking into account the fact that they are competing in an oligopoly, and factoring in differentiation across products. The solution to this problem, which was first proposed by Bresnahan (1987) , and later adopted, among others, by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) , consists of assuming that the location of firms' varieties in the product space is exogenous, and this source of exogenous variation across time and geographical markets can be exploited to identify the parameters of the econometric model.
This assumption seems particularly reasonable in the seed industry, because individual firms have shown a clear willingness to introduce traits into their seed lines as soon as they become available. Furthermore, in this context, it is crucial to appreciate that the technology to bring GE seeds to market entails a lengthy and complex process (Mumm and Walters, 2001) . Molecular biology and tissue culture techniques are used to introduce the gene(s) of interest into plant cells. Such transformed cells are then regenerated into whole plants, each of which is a distinct transformation "event" (which thus embeds the particular genotype, often not of commercial interest itself, used at the transformation stage). Extensive molecular and agronomic testing selects the best among the many events that are generated. The next step is the integration of the selected event into elite germplasm. For each commercial variety eventually developed, this requires repeated iteration of backcross breeding (crossing to a recurrent parent) to achieve the desired germplasm purity. 11 A key role is also played by the GE regulatory structure adopted by the United States, where the unit of evaluation is a unique event (McHughen and Smyth, 2008) .
The process of clearing the regulatory hurdles is onerous and, although it can be run concurrently with trait integration, is itself rather lengthy (Bradford et al., 2005) .
The entire process of producing GE varieties is very long: even abstracting from gene discovery and the transformation phase, the average time for trait integration into elite germplasm, field testing, regulatory compliance, and seed bulk-up needed to launch a commercial product is about seven years (Prado et al., 2014) . Moreover, this process is complex, and the need for extensive testing introduces randomness at various junctures. Even at the last stage of field testing, the seed firm's " . . . supply management may be dealing with a number of events or candidate products that ultimately will not proceed to commercialization." (Mumm and Walters, 2001) . Seed companies also invest in traditional breeding activities to improve germplasm, but again, they have an incentive to commercialize their best products at any given point in time. Moreover, the turnover of commercialized varieties is fairly high, with varieties exiting a market sometimes after only two or three years (Magnier, Kalaitzandonakes, and Miller, 2010) . Overall, this suggests that the introduction of new products is predetermined, embeds stochastic elements, and is largely exogenous to pricing decisions.
Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) we use functions of the traits in competing varieties as our instruments. As GE traits are the main characteristics that vary over seed varieties, this amounts to counting up the unique number of competing GE seed products. Specifically, we compute the total number of competing products (irrespective of GE traits) by: market; market and brand; market and parent company; market and crop; market, brand, and crop; and market, parent company, and crop. This results in six instrumental variables. We then compute the same variables for each of the three GE traits, plus non-GE products: GT, CB, RW, and non-GE. This results in an additional 24 instrumental variables (in total, there are 30 instrumental variables). Table 6 presents the estimation results for four different specifications of the seed demand model, which differ by the number of fixed effects that control for unobserved heterogeneity and by the type of logit model (simple logit versus nested logit). Specifically, columns 1 and 2 contain results for the two-level nested specification discussed in Section 4, and columns 3 and 4 contain results for the simple logit specification, which is equivalent to the special case σ 1 = σ 2 = 0. Our primary goal with this table is to establish how these modelling differences, and the use of instrumental variables, affect the estimated coefficients and the implied elasticities.
Results
In all four specifications in Table 6 , the coefficients are estimated fairly tightly, and the pricing and nested logit terms have the expected signs and ordering. The specification in column 1 is estimated with the richest set of fixed effects, which include year, CRD, and brand fixed effects, each of which are also interacted with the crop dummy variable (permitting response to differ between corn and soybeans). The year fixed effects control for temporal industry-wide changes, such as changes in output (corn and soybeans) prices, or changes in the prices of nonseed production inputs (e.g., fuel). The CRD fixed effects control for unobserved, timeinvariant regional-specific effects, such as the length of the growing season, soil quality, and weed pressure. The brand fixed effects control for unobserved (perceived and real) differences in the returns to each of the various brands. For example, in a given region, Pioneer seeds may be generally regarded by growers as high-yielding, and because of this, their prices may be higher. As it concerns fixed effects, the difference between column 1 and columns 2-4 is that the fixed effects in the latter are not interacted with a crop dummy variable.
Column 1 of Table 6 contains the most general specification of this table. The price coefficient is statistically significant and negative, as expected, and the nesting parameters are tightly estimated, with an ordering that is consistent with profit maximization (0 <σ 2 <σ 1 < 1). Their magnitude indicates strong correlation within nests, suggesting that once producers decide on which crop to plant on a given plot, they are unlikely to switch, both to another crop (corn or soybeans), and even less so to something besides corn or soybeans. This finding supports the rationalization of the two-level nested logit specification provided earlier. The remaining estimates presented in column 1 are for the coefficients associated with the GE trait dummy variables. In all cases, the estimates are positive, indicating that farmers are willing to pay a positive amount for each trait. These coefficients provide the basis for estimating farmers' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the innovation of GE traits, which we consider extensively in Section 6. Column 2 in Table 6 includes fewer controls by postulating year, CRD, and brand fixed effects that are not crop-specific. Relative to column 1, the results remain mostly unchanged, however, the subgroup nesting parameter, σ 2 , increases in size and the price coefficient is significantly smaller. This likely reflects the fact that including crop-specific effects controls for crop-specific unobservable differences in products that are correlated with prices. In moving from column 2 to column 3, we move from the two-level nested logit model to the basic logit model. This reduces flexibility in the substitution pattern between seed products (and also means that the coefficients of the price variable are not directly comparable). Finally, column 4 presents results for the simple logit model without instrumental variables for prices. The price coefficient without instruments is substantially smaller (in absolute value) than in column 3. The fact that the price coefficient increases so significantly when going from column 4 to column 3 indicates that prices are indeed endogenous, a finding that is typical of differentiated product markets (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Trajtenberg, 1989) .
Elasticities.
To better convey the implications of the different coefficients, Table 6 also reports mean own-and cross-price elasticities. Elasticity formulae for our two-level nested logit model are derived based on Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016) . The coefficients of the model in column 1 imply a mean own-price elasticity equal to −6.99, which is quite elastic. The estimated own-price elasticities get progressively smaller (in absolute value) in columns 2-4, as we include fewer controls and less flexibility in the substitution patterns. For the basic logit model in column 4, the implied mean own-price elasticity is just −0.25, an inelastic response which is inconsistent with models of profit-maximizing seed firms that sell differentiated products. For the most general model of column 1, the mean cross-price elasticities are 0.48 within a crop (e.g., from a soybean seed product to another soybean seed product) and 0.05 across crops (e.g., from a soybean seed product to a corn seed product). The difference between these mean elasticities underscores the relevance of the assumed nesting structure: growers more readily substitute toward products of the same crop in response to price increases in any given seed product. The estimated cross-price elasticity for the outside good is very small at just 0.02, or about one fortieth the magnitude of the mean cross-price elasticity for products of the same crop. This indicates that the aggregate demand for corn and soybean seed products is rather inelastic.
Subadditivity and time-varying GE trait effects. Table 7 provides results for two additional, more general parameterizations of the nested logit model. The model in column (1) allows for complementarities (or rivalries) among GE traits as inputs. More specifically, there is an additional indicator variable, Multiple Traits, that takes a value of one whenever there is more than one GE trait in a seed product. 12 The negative and significant coefficient in Table 7 for Multiple Traits indicates subadditivity in the value of products with multiple GE traits. That is, on average, farmers are willing to pay a bit less for each of multiple GE traits compared to what they would pay for those traits in isolation. This result is related to, but distinct from, that of Shi, Chavas, and Stiegert (2010) , who find subadditivity in the pricing of stacked GE trait varieties.
Our result, being rooted in a structural demand model, relates specifically to the value farmers place on GE traits.
Column (2) of Table 7 contains the estimates that we use for the welfare analysis. This representation permits the return to the various GE traits to differ across three subperiods. As noted earlier, this allows for the possibility that the average return to GE traits vary in accordance with the range of germplasm that incorporates them, and it is also consistent with important events that likely affected the return to GE products: the expiration of Monsanto's glyphosate patent in 2000; and, the sharp increase in crop output prices in 2007 as part of the most recent major commodity price boom (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010; Wright, 2011) . The results in column 2 strongly indicate that the returns to GE varieties were indeed different and increasing over these three subperiods. Specifically, the coefficient on the Soy GT Trait increased from 0. 
Welfare
The development and commercialization of GE crops has represented a major technological innovation for agriculture. The estimated seed demand model presented in the foregoing provides the ideal framework for a novel empirical assessment of the welfare effects of this innovation. To reach robust conclusions, we adopt a two-pronged approach. First, we use the estimated demand model to compute farmers' WTP for GE traits. This willingness-to-pay a premium for GE traits is equivalent to an upward shift in the demand facing seed companies. Hence, the ability to bundle GE traits with traditional germplasm holds the potential for seed companies to increase prices and boost revenues. Together with observed planted acres and price premia for GE products, estimated WTPs permits a first look at the total surplus created by GE varieties, as well as its distribution between farmers and seed firms. Alternatively, we use the structure of the estimated demand model to estimate the total net value of GE traits to farmers (increase in expected profit) by simulating a counterfactual in which GE traits are not available. This simulation requires knowledge of what conventional seed prices would have been in the absence of GE products. To compute such prices, we follow Hausman and Leonard (2002) by using a reduced-form hedonic price equation. By making assumptions on the nature of the unobservables, we estimate counterfactual prices (and counterfactual choice sets) had GE varieties not been introduced. The results of both of these approaches to welfare calculations are presented below.
Farmers' willingness-to-pay for GE traits. The WTP for a given GE trait combination is the maximum amount ($/acre) that a farmer would be willing to part with in order to have that particular combination added to a seed product line. To calculate farmers' WTP for GE traits, we use the demand estimates from the most general model (column 2 of Table 7 ). In a typical discrete-choice random-utility framework (e.g., the logit model), the (marginal) WTP for a particular characteristic is given by the ratio of the estimated coefficient on that characteristic to the estimated coefficient on the price variable (Train, 2009) . Although our latent return function is cardinal and denominated in dollars per acre (rather than utility), the general procedure remains the same: the WTP for a particular GE trait is the ratio of the coefficient associated with that trait and the estimated price coefficient. As noted earlier, the estimated price coefficient is the reciprocal of the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution. Thus, in dividing by the price coefficient, we are simply removing the scale factor from the trait coefficients. For example, the WTP for the GT trait in soybeans is: β SoyGT /α. For a combination of GE traits, the relevant WTP is recovered by dividing the sum of the associated trait coefficients by the price coefficient. For example, the WTP for the stacked combination GT-CB-RW in corn is (β CornGT + β C B + β RW + β Multi ple )/α. Table 8 contains WTP estimates for each of the GE trait combinations in each of the various subperiods. Because all prices in the analysis are deflated by an input price index normalized RW) . For the stand-alone and stacked combinations, the increase in value was greatest from the second to the third subperiod. The increase in the value of the triple-stack GT-CB-RW was particularly large, from $9.16 in the second subperiod to $35.30 in the last subperiod. The standard errors reported in Table 8 suggest that, overall, the WTPs for the GT trait in soybeans and for the CB trait in corn are precisely estimated. WTPs for the GT trait in corn are tightly estimated for the last two subperiods, and the WTPs for RW corn are only precise in the final subperiod. This is consistent with the adoption patterns illustrated in Table 2 ; the initially slower adoption of some corn GE traits translates into larger standard errors.
A common finding among all trait combinations is that their value increased over time, which is consistent with the temporal increase in the observed shares for GE products. One contributing factor has been falling glyphosate prices. Subsequent to the expiration of Monsanto's main glyphosate patent in 2000, the price of glyphosate fell from $12.42/lb. in 2000 to $4.74/lb. in 2011 (note: a standard application is 0.75 lb./acre). Because glyphosate is used more heavily with GT crops, a lower price for this herbicide reduces the farmers' production cost of GT crops relative to non-GT crops, reinforcing their adoption incentive. A second factor is rising output prices in the latter years of our sample. The average price received by farmers for corn, as reported by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), increased from $2.22/bu. in the subperiod 2001-2006 to $4.35/bu. in the final subperiod 2007-2011, whereas for soybeans, the corresponding price change was from $6.03/bu. to $10.30/bu. Naturally, an increase in the output price increases the value of yield-enhancing inputs. As noted, previous work has shown that IR traits in corn increase yields (Nolan and Santos, 2012; Xu et al., 2013) , and thus, higher output prices increase the relative value of the CB and RW traits. A third factor is learning, which may have played a role earlier on. Although the limited availability and breadth of GE seeds was Table 3 for selected years, but deflated by the crop sector input price index used in estimation) with observed planted acres of GE crops. Imputed net returns to farmers due to GE traits, reported in the last column, are the difference between columns 3 and 4.
another factor affecting adoption in the first few years, anecdotally it seems that most producers also had an initial trial run with GE crops before wholly committing to this technology. In other words, our WTP methodology is rooted in producers' perceived value of GE traits, which likely increased as evidence of the efficiency-enhancing properties of GE traits accumulated.
A final element to keep in mind in interpreting the results relates to our approach to product definition. Recall that we define a product as a crop-brand-trait combination, which means that we aggregate over varieties within each combination. Over time, the types and number of these varieties changed within each defined product. As noted earlier, for example, the number of Pioneer corn hybrids offered with the GT trait (across all markets) was 9 in 2003 and 75 in 2011. Thus, the various GE trait coefficients also capture the range of varieties that were offered within a particular product line. The wider the range of seeds offered within a product line, the more diverse the set of needs the line could match. For example, it is likely that the 9 corn GT hybrids offered by Pioneer in 2003 were not as ideally matched to farmer's needs as the 75 corn GT hybrids that the same company offered in 2011, and thus, the average 2003 value of the Pioneer GT line across all farmers was correspondingly smaller.
Total incremental surplus and seed revenues from GE traits. WTP estimates permit a first look at the welfare benefits that accrued to farmers and seed manufacturers from the introduction of GE traits. Specifically, multiplying the WTP estimates (as reported in Table 8 ) by the observed planted acres of each GE trait provides a first-order approximation to the total surplus created by the innovation. We can also use the average price premia from Table 3 (deflated by the crop input price index) along with observed planted acres of GE crops to compute an estimate of the seed industry revenues attributable to GE traits. The accuracy of these procedures rests on the assumptions that the number of acres cultivated to corn and soybeans would have been the same had GE traits not been introduced, and that observed conventional seed prices would have been the same absent the GE innovation. The results are reported in Table 9 .
Over the entire period 1996-2011, total surplus is estimated at $30.7 billion (in 2001 dollars)-$19.4 billion for soybeans and $11.2 billion for corn. During the same period, we find that the availability of GE traits increased seed industry revenues by $24.3 billion-$13.2 billion in corn seeds and $11.1 billion in soybean seeds. Finally, the values in the last column of Table 9 report the net returns to farmers, imputed as the difference between total surplus and seed industry revenues, associated with the adoption of GE traits. Over the entire period 1996-2011, we find that farmers' net returns were $6.3 billion higher because of the introduction of GE traits. Overall, these results suggest that seed manufacturers appropriated the larger portion of the surplus created by GE traits.
Imputed net returns to farmers show a clear difference between soybeans and corn. Perhaps surprisingly, the calculations reported in Table 9 suggest that net returns to corn farmers have been negative (a total loss of nearly $2 billion, most of which occurred in the first two subperiods of the analysis). To put this result in context, recall that the model's parameterization assumes that (within a given subperiod) all farmers have the same WTP parameters vis-à-vis GE traits. Insofar as the value of GE traits was heterogeneous across farmers, our WTP estimates, which reflect an average value across all farmers, underrepresent the value of GE traits to actual adopters. Also, as noted, the WTP estimates for GE corn traits are imprecise in the first two subperiods, which make the corresponding total surplus estimates less reliable. Moreover, whereas the procedure underlying Table 9 is attractive because it uses observed data and does not make additional assumptions on the structure of the unobservables, a major weakness is that it maintains that prices and quantities would have been the same had GE seeds not been introduced. This is an undesirable assumption for several reasons. First, the introduction of GE seeds resulted in more seed products available to farmers, especially in corn. This increased differentiation meant that farmers could choose seed products that better matched their growing conditions. 13 Second, standard considerations suggest that conventional seed prices would have been higher in the absence of GE traits. Similarly, if GE traits were indeed valuable, then total corn and soybean acres would have been lower in the absence of GE traits. Finally, observed average price premia fail to account for spatial price heterogeneity.
These limitations can be addressed by computing counterfactual prices that account for any competitive price effects that GE varieties may have exerted on non-GE products, by using the structure of the estimated demand model to compute counterfactual conventional seed products shares, and by developing counterfactual scenarios that can account for the impact of GE-induced product differentiation on farmers' expected profits and seed industry revenues.
Counterfactual prices.
To address the question of what (conventional) seed prices would have been without the GE technology, a possible approach is to construct a full structural equilibrium model embedding the main drivers of price changes in the industry. With this method, the literature generally maintains that firms behave as Bertrand oligopolists with differentiated products, and then simulates counterfactual solutions under alternative assumptions (Nevo, 2001; Petrin, 2002; Goeree, 2008) . The upside of this approach is that it makes the assumed economic context fully transparent. Such a structural model presents challenges in our context, however. This is because, although seed firms own their own germplasm, most of them have engaged in extensive licensing (and cross-licensing) arrangements for GE traits. Hence, the standard Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium conditions for differentiated products are not appropriate for this setting. Furthermore, the terms of the GE trait licensing arrangements between firms are not in the public domain (Moss, 2010) , which makes it problematic to develop a suitable structural representation of the supply side, an undertaking we leave for future research.
To proceed, we use a reduced-form hedonic approach, as in Hausman and Leonard (2002) . Although this method permits us to avoid specifying an explicit structural equilibrium model, and thus eschew the thorny issue of what to do about GE trait licensing, the validity of this approach rests on some strong conditions. In general, the reduced-form procedure is valid if GE trait entry were exogenous across markets and time, which would exclude the possibility that entry responds to market demand or cost shocks. This condition is unlikely to hold strictly in any empirical context. Still, our setting and approach display features that make this assumption more tenable. As discussed extensively earlier, the technology of introducing GE traits into commercial germplasm takes several years, it involves stochastic elements, and the complexity of the process requires assets that likely differ across firms, such that " . . . the duration of the process may differ across organizations." (Mumm, 2013) . Hence, even firms starting on the same footing (which actually they do not, because of the asymmetry between firms that need to in-license GE traits and vertically integrated firms that out-license such traits) can reach the market at different times. 14 Our conclusion, therefore, is that the entry of GE varieties in a particular market results from decisions taken years in advance, its timing is affected by random outcomes, and it is clearly predetermined relative to firms' pricing decisions. Furthermore, we include spatial and time fixed effects to control for unobserved differences in demand. Although we cannot entirely rule out correlation of unobservables over time, it seems reasonable to expect that, in our context, this effect (if present) is significantly attenuated.
To begin with, we estimate the following hedonic price equation:
where D c [ j] ,m are crop-specific post-GE indicator variables that are equal to one for any observation in a market for which a GE variety is available (or was available in an earlier year for the CRD pertaining to that market), otherwise, this variable is equal to zero. The coefficients on these "post-GE" variables capture, in a reduced-form way, the overall price effects from the introduction of GE innovations. The price effects are identified from the fact that GE varieties were introduced at different times in different regions (i.e., CRDs). Conditional on CRD-specific and time fixed effects, the time of introduction can be assumed exogenous for reasons previously noted. The hedonic price equation in (11) also includes GE trait dummies x jm . The remaining terms in this l[m] , and ζ c [ j],b[ j] are, respectively, crop-year, crop-CRD, and crop-brand fixed effects, and υ jm is an idiosyncratic shock. Table 10 presents the estimation results for the hedonic price equation. The first row shows the effect of the introduction of the GE varieties on the prices of all soybean seed products. We find that the prices of soybean seeds decreased, on average, by $1.87 when GE products were present. The second row shows the corresponding impact on corn seed prices, which were lower by $0.38. These are relatively small competitive price effects, suggesting that any substantial welfare effects primarily stem from an increase in the portfolio of choices that the farmers can make, or because of the difference between the prices charged for GE traits and farmers' willingness to pay for them.
The hedonic results also show that GE traits are associated with significantly higher prices, implying that farmers pay considerable premia for GE innovations, as anticipated by the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3 . For example, we find that the premium for the soy GT trait was $15.46 in the 1996 GT trait was $15.46 in the -2000 it declined to $13.83 in 2001 , and to $11.42 in 2007 The corn GT trait, instead, saw the premium increase from $11.43 in the first subperiod to $13.22 in the final subperiod. The corn CB and RW traits saw the premium decline over time, but the premium was always greater than $9 over the sample period. Finally, the Multiple Trait stack is associated with a subadditivity effect, with prices being lower when GE traits are stacked (this effect amounted to $4.52 for the last subperiod, where the triple stack GT-CB-RW was widely adopted). This subadditive effect is consistent with previous findings by Shi, Chavas, and Stigert (2010) .
In addition to being informative of the price premiums that seed companies were able to charge for transgenic varieties, the estimated hedonic equation permits us to infer the prices that would have materialized had GE traits not been introduced in corn and soybean seed varieties. GT trait, 1996 GT trait, -2000 15.4602 (0.2401) Soybean GT trait, 2001 GT trait, -2006 13.8320 (0.2407) Soybean GT trait, 2007 11.4231 (0.3637) Corn GT trait, 1996 11.4280 (0.4607) Corn GT trait, 2001 10.2175 (0.1904 ) Corn GT trait, 2007 13.2164 (0.1794 ) Corn Borer trait, 1996 12.9370 (0.2592 ) Corn Borer trait, 2001 10.3001 (0.1785 ) Corn Borer trait, 2007 9.5263 (0.2287 ) Root Worm trait, 2001 15.0945 (0.2961) Root Worm trait, 2007 Worm trait, -2011 Worm trait, 11.5234 (0.1978 Note: The first row shows the effect of the introduction of the GE varieties on the prices of all soybean seed products. The second row shows the corresponding impact on corn seed prices. The model was estimated with crop-year, crop-brand, and crop-CRD fixed effects, which are not reported here.
We do this by turning off the categorical variable that is equal to 1 if there was an innovation, and by turning off the variables associated with the various GE traits. More specifically, using the estimation output from Table 10 , the predicted prices in the presence of GE traits are given by:
Had transgenic varieties not been introduced, counterfactual predicted prices without GE traits are given by:p jm =ζ c [ j],t[m] +ζ c [ j],l[m] +ζ c [ j],b[ j] .
(13) GE seeds and farmers' welfare: structural approach. In combination with the structural demand model, the counterfactual prices thus constructed provide the basis for assessing the impact of GE product innovations on total surplus and its distribution. Because the demand model is rooted in farmers' expected profit maximization, it is natural to start with assessing farmers' net returns. Computation of farmers' welfare change attributable to the introduction of GE varieties relies on the change in the overall inclusive values, scaled by the price parameter (i.e., the coefficient α). Specifically, in each market m, the change in per-acre surplus (expected profit) due to GE traits is given by:
whereÎ m is the predicted inclusive value with GE traits andĨ m is the predicted inclusive value in a world without GE traits (see equation (9) for the definition of I m ). To obtain the total dollar value of GE traits in market m, we multiply m by the potential market size (in acres) of market m, and to compute the dollar value of GE traits in the entire sample, we simply add up the dollar values across all markets. As previously noted, the estimates thus obtained are expressed in 2011 dollars.
The primary inputs for equation (14) are the estimated demand parameters (α,σ 1 ,σ 2 ) and mean farmers' profits δ jm . Using the predicted hedonic prices with GE traits, and the estimated terms from the seed demand equations, predicted mean profits with GE traits are given by 15 :
whereas predicted mean profits without GE traits are given by:
A feature to note about this procedure is that it involves the modification of characteristics associated with GE varieties. As previously noted, by the end of the sample, GE varieties had not only significantly added to the set of available products, but had also replaced most conventional offerings. 16 In 1996, for example, non-GE varieties comprised 57 out of 66 products; by 2011, they comprised just 38 out of 161 products. If we were to remove GE products entirely from the choice set in 2011, that would leave just 38 products available to growers, a number which likely underestimates what would have been available in the counterfactual. Maintaining such an artificial reduction in non-GE products in the relevant counterfactual has the potential to introduce bias in the estimated welfare gains from GE traits. This is especially problematic in the context of logit models. As noted by Petrin (2002) and Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) , among others, the postulated underlying structure implies that an additional option mechanically increases (expected) welfare because it provides another draw from the distribution of random shocks. 17 We address this issue by considering results for four different counterfactual scenarios. In the first scenario, we simply remove all the GE products from the choice set of the counterfactual scenario, adjust the prices of the remaining conventional products (as per the hedonic price regression), and compute the welfare change of seed users accordingly. 18 As implied by the foregoing discussion, this approach (labelled the "naive" scenario) is expected to penalize the non-GE counterfactual and thus inflate the estimated welfare effects.
Alternatively, instead of simply removing GE products from the choice set, we modify the characteristics of GE products by removing the GE trait, adjusting the price, and then maintain this "synthetic" product in the counterfactual choice set if it does not duplicate an equivalent non-GE product already present. The presumption is that seed manufacturers would have used the germplasm currently combined with GE traits to commercialize alternative conventional seed products instead. For example, suppose that in a given market there are three seed products: Dekalb-GE-corn, Asgrow-conventional-soybeans, and Pioneer-conventional-corn. If we followed the naive approach, removal of GE traits would drop one product from the choice set (the remaining two would be Asgrow-conventional-soybeans and Pioneer-conventional-corn). Instead, with the proposed alternative counterfactual, we retain three products: the two preexisting conventional seed products plus the synthetic Dekalb-non-GE-corn. Implementation of this alternative procedure to construct the choice set of the counterfactual requires the resolution of a possible ambiguity. In some markets, after modifying the characteristics of GE products, we can end up with "duplicates" vis-à-vis the definition of products used in this study, the only difference being in the unobservable componentξ jm . 19 This presents the question of which duplicate product to keep in the counterfactual choice set. To proceed, we consider two versions of this alternative approach. In one case, we keep the duplicate with the largestξ jm (i.e., the largest mean expected 15 Note that the baseline also uses predicted prices (rather than observed prices), just as the counterfactuals. 16 The crowding out of old products due to the introduction of new ones is the main concern of Eizenberg's (2014) study of the impact of innovation in central processing units for US personal computers. 17 Nevo (2011) provides an extended discussion of this point and notes that the logit model per se is actually not the source of biased welfare estimates. Rather, the bias may arise from using the logit model to predict counterfactual shares. 18 In equation (14), this amounts to anĨ m , in which the exponential terms for GE products have simply been deleted. 19 For example, in a market where we have both conventional Asgrow soybeans and GT Asgrow soybeans, shutting down the GT traits yields two versions of Asgrow conventional soybean seeds. profit for farmers). We call this the "keep best" scenario. In the other case, we keep the duplicate that was originally a non-GE variety, a situation that we label the "keep conventional" scenario. 20 Finally, we also consider the "keep all" scenario, where it is assumed that all synthetic products obtained from the removal of GE traits in the counterfactual are viable and are therefore kept in the choice set. Table 11 reports the average number of products, for both corn and soybeans, that pertain to the foregoing four counterfactual scenarios for each of the three subperiods of the analysis. Comparing the data in Table 11 with the number of products available prior to the advent of GE varieties, it is clear that the naive and the "keep all" scenarios are not plausible. The naive scenario is associated with a drastic reduction in the number of products, especially for the last subperiod. This is most apparent for soybeans, a reflection of the almost complete adoption of the GT trait in the latter years of the sample. Conversely, the "keep all" scenario displays an artificially large number of products, especially for corn. 21 Clearly, neither of these two scenarios are likely to produce credible results. Hence, here we report the counterfactual results only for the other two scenarios, "keep conventional" and "keep best." 22 We note at this juncture that, by picking the seed product with the largestξ jm , the "keep best" scenario provides a more conservative estimated impact of GE traits on farmers' expected profit than the "keep conventional" scenario. However, for this very reason, the "keep best" scenario can underpenalize the non-GE counterfactual. Indeed, when the unobserved component for a synthetic non-GE product exceeds that of a (preexisting) conventional non-GE product, then it is possible for the mean expected return of this synthetic non-GE product to exceed the expected return of any seed product that existed when GE products were still available. For this reason, we view the "keep conventional" counterfactual scenario as the most realistic counterfactual.
The first two results columns in Table 12 report the estimated farmers' welfare gains for the two scenarios of interest, and across the three subperiods. For each scenario, we consider three distinct thought experiments: (i) a market without GE soybean products; (ii) a market without GE corn products; and, (iii) a market that excludes GE products in both corn and soybeans. The three exercises are helpful in providing insights into whether GE traits affected the two crops differentially.
The first set of results in Table 12 pertains to the entire period 1996-2011. We find that, under the "keep best" scenario, total farmers' welfare gain from GE innovations is estimated at about $14.4 billion. It is interesting to note that three quarters of these gains are attributable to one trait: glyphosate tolerance in soybeans. For the "keep conventional" scenario, the estimated farmers' welfare gains are larger, $22.2 billion. The remainder data in the first two results columns 20 In cases where there are duplicate synthetic conventional products, but no preexisting conventional product, we keep the synthetic conventional product with the highest mean return. 21 From Table 5 , in 1996, at the dawn of the GE era, the average number of conventional seed products per market (i.e., CRD) was 3.9 for soybeans and 6.2 for corn. By contrast, for the last subperiod (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , the naive scenario entails 0.8 seed products per CRD for soybeans and 3.2 seed products for corn. By contrast, the average number of seed products in the "keep all" scenario in the same subperiod was 6.3 for soybeans and 19.9 for corn. 22 We report the full set of results in the Supplementary Information online web Appendix (Appendix D). the structural estimates suggest that it was closer to an even split. Specifically, in the last five years of the sample (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , the results in Table 9 imply that the seed industry captured 75% of the total surplus, whereas the results in Table 12 imply a fraction of 56% (for the "keep conventional" scenario). It is also of some interest that results differ across soybean and corn seeds. Although farmers received the majority of their surplus from soybean GE traits, more total surplus has been generated by GE traits in corn, and the seed industry has been able to extract the larger share of total surplus in corn. In the final subperiod (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , Table 9 implies that 100% of the GE trait surplus created in corn seeds was appropriated by seed manufacturers, whereas in Table 12 , this fraction ranges between 74% ("keep best" scenario) and 67% ("keep conventional" scenario).
The estimated seed industry revenue increases due to GE crops, and the estimated increases in farmers' expected profits, both measure ex post welfare gains from GE crops. The interpretation is somewhat different, though. For farmers, the figures in Table 12 can be interpreted as net welfare gains: that is, the dollar value of how much better off farmers have been by their ability to purchase GE varieties-notwithstanding the fact that they had to pay a premium for GE seeds. For the seed industry, on the other hand, increased revenues can be interpreted as ex post returns to past investments in R&D activities. 23 Still, comparing the magnitude of gains accruing to farmers and the seed industry, we see that the latter has been fairly effective at capturing the value created by GE trait innovations. For example, over the last five years of the sample (2007-2011), for the "keep conventional" scenarios, farmers' net welfare increased by $11.3 billion, whereas seed industry revenue increased by $14.6 billion. Thus, during this period, the seed industry appears to have been able to capture approximately 56% of the overall monetary value of GE traits.
Conclusion
In this article, we provide an empirical assessment of the value of one of the major innovations affecting US agriculture in the last several decades, the introduction of GE traits in US corn and soybeans. Our approach is based on a two-level nested logit model of seed demand, in which farmers choose the most profitable option among corn and soybean seed varieties (and an outside option). This specification is consistent with the important mechanism of corn-soybean rotations and it also partially addresses well-known limitations of using the basic logit model to estimate the welfare impact of new products. The model is estimated using a unique, large data set on US corn and soybean seed purchases during the 1996-2011 time frame. Using the demand estimates, we find that farmers are willing to pay a significant premium for GE traits, and the extent of this willingness has increased significantly over time.
We estimate the total surplus created by the introduction of GE traits, and its distribution between farmers and seed manufacturers, with two alternative methods. In the first approach, we recover the total surplus created via the estimated farmers' WTP for the various GE traits, along with observed plantings of GE varieties. With this approach, based on observed price premia between GE and conventional varieties, we also compute the additional revenues for the seed industry due to GE traits embedded into marketed seed varieties (as well as the implied net residual surplus left for farmers). In the second approach, we use the structure of the estimated demand model, along with counterfactual prices obtained from a reduced-form hedonic equation, to infer market conditions that would have prevailed had GE traits not been introduced. Our counterfactual scenarios are adjusted to account for the fact GE crop varieties gradually crowded 23 The implicit assumption, here, is that the marginal production cost to seed firms for GE and non-GE varieties is the same. To put our estimates in context, it may be helpful to consider the extent of R&D in this industry. For the five-year period 2007-2011, data reported by Phillips (2014) suggest that the R&D expenditures of the six largest agro-chemical firms, for the seed and GE trait segment, amounted to approximately $13 billion. As for individual companies, publicly available data for Monsanto are most informative, because this company's R&D is almost exclusively devoted to seeds and traits. Monsanto's annual disclosures to the US Security and Exchange Commission indicate a total of $5.45 billion in R&D expenditures for the 2007-2011 period. out conventional varieties. More specifically, rather than simply removing a GE product from farmers' choice sets, we also simulate scenarios in which modified GE products are retained in farmers' counterfactual choice sets. In so doing, we avoid the bias that would result from conflating the removal of the GE technology with an artificial reduction in product diversity.
Our findings suggest that the welfare benefits from GE crops are significant. For the last five years of the period analyzed, when adoption of GE traits had reached maturity, estimated total surplus from the two methods discussed ranged from $3.73 billion to $5.18 billion per year. To put matters in context, over this five-year period, total planted acres to corn and soybeans averaged at 162.7 million per year. Hence, the estimated total surplus due to GE traits reported earlier ranged from $22.9 to $31.9 per acre of planted crop. We also find that seed manufacturers have been able to appropriate the larger share of this surplus. It is also of some interest that the results differ across soybean and corn seeds. Although farmers received the majority of their surplus from soybean GE traits, more total surplus has been generated by GE traits in corn, and the seed industry has been able to extract the larger share of total surplus in corn. These results are consistent with the observation that intellectual property rights have historically played a stronger role in the corn seed industry. As noted earlier, the commercialization of hybrid varieties, starting in the 1930s, provided the technology to develop improved germplasm as a proprietary asset. Conversely, for soybeans seeds, strong property rights only materialized in the 1990s, with the diffusion of contractual clauses based on newly asserted patent rights (Clancy and Moschini, 2017) .
Our work has some important implications for the ongoing debate surrounding GE crops. First, our estimates suggest that, at least up to 2011, farmers still obtained significant net benefits from adopting GE crop varieties, notwithstanding the higher seed prices they paid. It is also notable that seed firms were able to extract the larger share of the ex post welfare effects of GE traits. Appropriability of ex post returns from innovation is essential to ensure that firms have continuing incentives to invest in R&D. This is particularly important in the modern seed industry, where private R&D funds have vastly exceeded public R&D investments in recent years (Clancy, Fuglie, and Heisey, 2016) . Methodologically, our counterfactual approach to estimating welfare may be applied to settings in which new products tends to crowd out and replace existing products.
Some caveats are also worth noting in closing. Our analysis of the welfare effects of GE crops pertains to their direct economic consequences for farmers and the seed industry. Welfare implications arising from possible external effects, such as unintended environmental effects, are obviously not encompassed by our methodology. Also, our framework does not capture the possible impact of GE trait adoption on crop output prices, which precludes a fuller welfare impact assessment. Finally, a structural representation of the supply side might be preferable to the reduced-form approach used in this article. This, however, would require a model that accommodates the complex web of GE trait cross-licensing agreements between seed firms, an undertaking that we leave for future studies. XU, Z., HENNESSY, D.A., SARDANA, K., AND MOSCHINI, G. "The Realized Yield Effect of Genetically Engineered Crops: U.S. Maize and Soybean." Crop Science, Vol. 53 (2013), pp. 735-745.
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